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Transitional Justice in Post-war Afghanistan
by Ossai Miazad*

T

he September 11th attacks on the United States (U.S.)
and the ensuing war against terrorism have galvanized
world attention onto the political situation in
Afghanistan. This attention is likely to lead Afghanistan into
a phase of reconstruction after two decades of war and conflict. The country’s political leaders face many challenges as
they seek to rebuild the nation and restore the rule of law.
Similar to the experience of other transitional governments,
Afghanistan’s newly established leaders will be required to
address the severe and systematic violations of humanitarian
and human rights law perpetrated by the previous regimes
and the country’s warring factions. During the last decade of
conflict in Afghanistan in particular, these violations have
taken on the added dimensions of ethnic- and gender-based
persecution. If Afghanistan is to move toward a durable
peace, it must break the cycle of impunity by instituting a legal
approach to account for past abuses of humanitarian and
human rights law.
On December 5, 2001, the United Nations (UN) brokered talks in Bonn, Germany, culminating in an agreement
for Afghanistan’s future political framework. This remarkable
achievement marked a new beginning for the war-torn nation.
By establishing a six-month interim administration, the agreement signaled the first step toward the country’s reconstruction. After six months, power will shift to a two-year
transitional administration; at the end of this term, power will
be transferred to a government established through national
elections. The agreement addresses important human rights
concerns, particularly with regard to the representation of
women and ethnic minorities in the new administration.
Although earlier drafts of the agreement prohibited an
interim authority from granting amnesty to those suspected
of crimes against humanity, the provision was later deleted
from the final agreement at the insistence of members of the
United Front delegation. The final agreement remains silent
on the transitional authorities’ obligation and commitment
to bringing war criminals to justice.
The formidable task of rebuilding Afghanistan and reintegrating it into the international community will require measures to ensure accountability for past war crimes. Afghanistan
is obligated by the UN Conventions to which it is a party, and
by international customary law, to hold accountable perpetrators of humanitarian and human rights law violations.
Further, by establishing a well-crafted and effective legal
response to such violations, a new Afghan government can
meet the goals of serving justice, building confidence in the
new administration, and prohibiting war criminals from
entering future governments.

Background
The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 24,
1979, motivated both by political expansionist goals and the
fear that instability within its small Central Asian neighbor
might spill into its own borders. Its immediate task was to
crush the uprisings stirred by the policies and repressive tactics of the Khalq faction of the People’s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan, an Afghan communist party that had seized
control of the country through a coup d’etat on April 27,
1978.
An estimated 1.24 million Afghans died during the decadelong Soviet occupation, and the flow of refugees, primarily
2

to bordering Pakistan and Iran, reached five million. Armed
groups at the center of the resistance against the Soviet
occupation collectively became known as the mujahiddin.
Although engaged in a common resistance movement, the
mujahiddin were composed of ethnic, tribal, and political
factions as diverse as the population of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan became a Cold War battleground. The United
States and Saudi Arabia provided most of the massive support
for the resistance, nearly all of which was funneled through Pakistan. The policy implemented on the ground was to provide
the greatest support to the most radical mujahiddin groups.
Thousands of fighters from the Middle East and North Africa
joined the resistance forces. Among them was Osama bin
Laden, who came to Pakistan in the early 1980s and built
training facilities for these foreign recruits inside Afghanistan.
The final withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in
February of 1989 did not lead to an end to armed conflict in
the country. Despite the troop withdrawals, a Soviet-supported
government remained in control. By 1992 the mujahiddin had
toppled the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan. In the
aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal, the U.S. and its western
allies abandoned war-torn Afghanistan. The United Nations’
efforts toward brokering a settlement for a transitional government suffered from a lack of commitment by Afghanistan’s
neighbors and the international community. No longer
engaged against a common enemy, a power struggle among
the various mujahiddin factions soon erupted. It was within
this political vacuum that armed factions, many led by former
mujahiddin commanders, established themselves as the local
authority.
continued on next page
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Humanitarian Law
The principles set out by the 1949 Geneva Conventions
(Conventions) guide international humanitarian law. As a sigThe framework for an interim government forged by
natory to the Conventions, Afghanistan is a High ContractPakistani-based mujahiddin in the Peshawar Agreement of
ing Party and is bound by Common Article 3. Aimed at
April 24, 1992, crumbled only months after its implementaensuring the humane treatment of anyone not participating
tion. The failed power sharing agreement of the Afghan
in hostilities, Common Article 3 applies as soon as a situation
Interim Government (AIG) left Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader
of internal armed conflict exists within the territory of a
of the mujahiddin faction of Jamiat-e Islami (Society of Islam),
party to the Conventions. The legal obligations imposed on
and his defense minister Ahmad Shah Massoud, seated in the
each party to the conflict, with respect to the treatment of
capital city of Kabul, although their control over the capital
persons taking no active part in hostilities, prohibit the folwas by no means complete. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of
lowing acts: (1) violence to life and person, in particular murHezb-e Islami (Islamic Party), a rival mujahiddin faction and
der of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (2)
prime minister of the AIG, continued to bombard Kabul,
taking of hostages; (3) outrages upon personal dignity, in parand by 1994 a full-scale civil war had erupted among the varticular humiliating and degrading treatment; and (4) passious rival factions. The Rabbani government remained in
ing sentences and carrying out executions without previous
Kabul until September 1996 when its members were forced
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court that
to retreat north by the Taliban, an armed militia comprised
affords the judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable
mainly of non-Afghan combatants and Afghan refugees, who
by civilized peoples. Further, the customary law of armed conhad studied in religious schools in Pakistan.
flict recognizes the principle of civilian immunity and the
With extensive foreign support, particularly from Pakistan,
obligation of warring parties to distinguish between comthe Taliban declared itself the government of Afghanistan in
batants and civilians. UN
1996. Initial signs from
General Assembly ResoWashington indicated
lution 2444, Respect for
a tacit approval of the
Human Rights in Armed
Taliban takeover. The
Conflicts, adopted on
regime’s refusal to
December 19, 1968, proextradite Osama bin
hibits attacks on civilian
Laden and its violations
populations, and notes
of basic human rights
that a distinction must be
principles, particularly
made at all times between
regarding women’s
persons taking part in hosrights, led to its isolatilities and members of
tion by the international
the civilian population in
community. Only Saudi Official signing of the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in
order to ensure that the
Arabia, the United Arab Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government
latter be spared as much
Emirates, and Pakistan Institutions.
as possible.
granted the Taliban official recognition. The
Indiscriminate Bombings
rise of the Taliban spurred the formation of the anti-Taliban
The civilian population in Afghanistan has suffered
coalition known as the United Front (including parties that forrepeated violations of humanitarian law through indismerly made up the Northern Alliance), whose main foreign supcriminate bombings and targeted persecution based on ethporters included India, Iran, and Russia. The United Front,
nicity or political affiliation. For example, during the Sovietwhich controlled pockets of territory in northern and central
backed Afghan government’s military operations, Scud
Afghanistan, supported the government headed by Rabbani.
missiles and other methods of warfare that lack sufficient
Because the Taliban had not consolidated control over the
accuracy and targeting capability were employed. Weapons
entire country, military offensives and fighting between the Talthat cannot be directed at a specific military objective violate
iban and United Front continued throughout the Taliban’s
the laws of war, because their use leaves the civilian popureign in Kabul.
lation vulnerable.
An estimated 25,000 people were killed in Kabul in 1994
Violations of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law
alone
when Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and General Abdul
Severe violations of international humanitarian and
Rashid Dostum, founder and principle leader of the Junbishhuman rights law have occurred throughout the conflicts in
i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan (National Islamic Movement of
Afghanistan. The violations of humanitarian law have
Afghanistan) (Junbish) launched a full-scale civil war in an
included direct attacks on civilian populations, indiscriminate
effort to oust the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani.
aerial bombardment, summary executions, and rape. No
Civilians comprised most of the casualties resulting from
single faction holds a monopoly on committing these violarocket and artillery attacks. A 1999 UN report noted that in
tions; rather, a cycle of impunity has instigated reprisal
recent years the Taliban has intensified aerial bombardkillings and the repetition of atrocities. In many cases,
ment, causing considerable civilian casualties, damage to
support from neighboring countries has fueled the violence
property, and displacement of the population.
by pitting one warring faction against the other. Additionally, each faction is responsible for violations of human
Forced Displacement and Summary Execution
rights law, including arbitrary detention, forced labor, forced
Political affiliation or perceived loyalties have rendered
deportations, and ethnic based violence. Moreover, women
individuals and entire communities victims of acts of vioand girls living under the Taliban regime have perhaps
lence and terror. Human Rights Watch has documented the
faced some of the most severe and systematic human rights
violations.
continued on next page
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The report documented the February 1993 killing, rape,
and disappearances of ethnic Hazaras in West Kabul perpetuated by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf’s Ittihad-i Islami (Islamic
Union). Further, the 1995 U.S. State Department report on
human rights practices noted that after capturing Kabul’s
predominantly ethnic-Hazara neighborhood of Karte Seh,
Northern Alliance troops systematically looted whole streets
and raped the women residents.

Credit: Nooria

targeting of ethnic Pashtuns and others suspected of supporting the Taliban in areas controlled by the United Front.
Such targeting, which took place as recently as 2000, included
summary executions, burning of houses, and looting. In May
1997, Junbish forces, as members of the United Front under
the command of General Abdul Malik Pahlawan, summarily
executed an estimated 3,000 Taliban prisoners of war in
Human Rights Law
Mazar-i Sharif. Accounts of the brutal killings indicate that
Similar to the humanitarian law violations, there have been
some of the prisoners of war were taken to the desert and shot
widespread abuses of human rights law. Throughout the
while others were thrown down wells and blown up with
conflict, women have suffered some of the most egregious
grenades. A report prepared by Kamal Hossain, UN Special
human rights violations. The most systematic and horrific vioRapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, describes
lations of women’s rights have occurred under the Taliban
reported summary executions of suspected supporters of
regime.
the United Front by
Afghanistan ratified
Taliban forces entering
the
International
into villages in Bamyan,
Covenant on Civil and
a region located in cenPolitical
Rights
tral Afghanistan. The
(ICCPR) and the Intersame report highlights
national Covenant on
the forced displaceEconomic, Social and
ment of 65,000 to
Cultural Rights in 1983,
150,000 civilians during
and the Covenant on
a Taliban offensive in
the Rights of the Child
the Shamali Plains, an
in 1994. In 1980,
area north of Kabul
Afghanistan signed, but
controlled by opposihas yet to ratify, the
tion forces. The Special
Convention on the
Rapporteur’s report
Elimination of All
cites first-hand accounts
Forms of Discriminaof house and crop
tion Against Women.
burnings, forced deporThe principles set forth
tations, family separain the treaties, as well
tions, the separation
as in the UN Declaraand deportation of
tion of Human Rights,
women, and arbitrary
Women and children having tea in an Afghan refugee camp. The photo was
grant women and girls
killing in southern taken as part of a project organized by a University of Michigan student that
the
fundamental rights
Shamali.
encourages refugees to document their lives.
to education, work,
health care, freedom of
Ethnic-based Massacres
movement, and equality under the law. The ICCPR specifiHuman rights organizations and the UN have docucally protects women from gender-based violence, and tormented several Taliban-led massacres of the Hazara ethnic
ture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punminority. Two of the most recent massacres occurred in
ishment.
May 2000 and January 2001. The latest reported massacre
Through official edicts, the Taliban prohibited girls from
occurred at Yakaolang in the central highlands of
going to school, refused women the right to work outside the
Afghanistan. One UN investigator described the sight of
home, with the exception of some health care workers, and
bodies in a mass grave, hands tied behind their backs: “[i]n
severely restricted women’s and girls’ access to adequate
no way was Yakaolang an isolated, or locally organized event,”
health care. In addition to denying these basic human rights,
but rather “a centrally organized operation.” UN investigathe Taliban severely restricted women’s freedom of movetors estimate there have been fifteen separate massacres of
ment. By official decree women were prohibited from leavcivilians over the last four years, and explain that each masing their homes unless they wore a burqa (a head-to-toe garsacre has been highly systematic and can be traced to the Talment with a small mesh opening at the eyes) and were
iban’s Ministry of Defense or to Mullah Omar, the Taliban
accompanied by a close male relative. Before the Taliban
self-proclaimed Amir al-Momeneen (Ruler of the Faithful).
assumed control, seventy percent of all teachers, fifty percent
The UN report also notes the participation of non-Afghan
of civil servants, and forty percent of medical doctors in the
combatants, including Pakistanis and members of Osama bin
country were women. The policies of the Taliban have taken
Laden’s al-Qaeda organization.
a heavy toll on the people of Afghanistan, particularly women
and girls.
The Intersection of Gender and Ethnicity: Rape as a
According to a 1999 report issued by Radhika
Weapon of War
Coomaraswamy, UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women have been targeted on the basis of both gender
Women, the Taliban enforced their discriminatory edicts by
and ethnicity, and have faced sexual assault, abduction, and
punishment without any due process rights. Punishment for
forced marriage throughout the armed conflict. A 2001
Human Rights Watch report named opposition commancontinued on next page
ders with records of serious violations of humanitarian law.
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requires rebuilding, a domestic response to past war crimes
will likely demonstrate the greatest legitimacy and garner
support among the Afghan people. There is a commonly
transgressions against the Taliban’s regulations included
held perception among Afghans that they have been the vicpublic flogging, stoning, and public execution. Murder,
tims of foreign meddling. Many of the war criminals that
working with the opposition, sodomy, and adultery were conshould be brought to justice have received support from
sidered crimes that carried the death penalty. Amnesty Interneighboring countries. A domestic tribunal can thus help to
national reported that during 2000 at least fifteen people faced
establish the sentiment that the country is reclaiming control
public executions, including the stoning to death of a woman.
rather than perpetuating a sense of helplessness.
The Taliban’s policy toward women and girls has had a lifeSeveral challenges exist to the domestic prosecution of war
threatening effect on an already suffering population. Each
criminals in Afghanistan. Factional rifts and suspicion have
day an estimated forty-five Afghan women die from pregnancyintensified as a result of the war. Consequently, maintaining
related causes, and the rate of illiteracy among girls has
a sense of order and fairness may be difficult. These issues
reached ninety percent. In 1998, Physicians for Human
have been mitigated in other countries facing similar situaRights reported that ninety-four percent of the Afghan women
tions by ensuring transparency throughout the prosecution
interviewed suffered from severe depression. Women and girls
process as well as the diversity of investigators, prosecutors,
will likely continue to feel the impact of the discriminatory
and judges. The prosecution process must be committed to
policies long after the Taliban’s departure.
investigating and prosecuting war crimes committed by individuals on all sides.
International Obligations and Mechanisms for
The violations that have occurred in Afghanistan have
Accountability
been so extensive and widespread that prosecution of every
The kind of violence and persecution that occurred in
perpetrator may be impossible and destabilizing. InternaAfghanistan makes granting blanket immunity to perpetrational practice suggests that in such
tors of abuses inconsistent with
a situation, representative prosecuinternational law standards. A
tion of those most culpable may satThe
kind
of
violence
and
persecution
new government in Afghanistan
isfy international obligations. For
will have the obligation to at
that occurred in Afghanistan makes
example, the tribunals established
least punish the most egregious
granting
blanket
immunity
to
perpetrators
in Rwanda delineated four levels of
human rights violations. This
culpability: (1) the planners and leadobligation is most explicitly set
of abuses inconsistent with international
ers of the genocide, those in posiforth by the Convention on the
law standards.
tions of authority who fostered these
Prevention and Punishment of
crimes, and particularly notorious
the Crime of Genocide (Genokillers and sexual torturers; (2) othcide Convention) and the Convention Against Torture and
ers
who
killed;
(3)
those
who committed crimes other than
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishrape or murder against persons; and (4) those who comment (CAT). These conventions require states not only to
mitted offenses against property. All suspects who fell into
protect the rights prescribed, but also to prosecute acts of
the first category should find themselves subject to full prosgenocide and torture perpetrated in their territories.
ecution and punishment. If those in the second and third catAfghanistan ratified the Genocide Convention in 1956 and
egories, who are likely to make up the vast majority, fully conthe CAT in 1987. Article 5 of the Genocide Convention
fess to their crimes and provide information on accomplices
requires contracting parties “to provide effective penalties for
or co-conspirators, they will in turn receive an expedited
persons guilty of genocide.” Further, Article 6 requires that
process and reduced penalty. Finally, fourth category suspects
persons charged with genocide “shall be tried by a compewill not face criminal prosecution.
tent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was
committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may
Non-criminal Sanctions
have jurisdiction.” Similarly, the CAT requires states either
Non-criminal sanctions can also serve an important and
to investigate and prosecute those who commit acts of
necessary function. Such sanctions may prevent guilty partorture, or to extradite suspects to other jurisdictions. Custies from assuming public office. It is difficult to imagine how
tomary law imposes a similar obligation: “[a] state violates cusa new Afghan government can win the confidence of the miltomary law if it practices or encourages genocide, fails to
lions of refugees and internally displaced people who will
make genocide a crime or to punish persons guilty of it, or
return to Afghanistan to find the individuals responsible
otherwise condones genocide.”
for the atrocities committed against them in renewed posiA variety of mechanisms for accountability have been
tions of authority. An example of the use of non-criminal
implemented in countries emerging from conflict.
sanctions can be found in the Dayton Peace Accords, which
Approaches include domestic prosecution by establishing a
brought an end to the fighting in Bosnia by requiring “the
special prosecutors office and using the local courts; nonprosecution, dismissal or transfer, as appropriate, of persons
criminal sanctioning to offset the challenges related to crimin military, paramilitary, and police forces and other public
inally prosecuting large numbers of individuals involved in
servants, responsible for serious violations of the basic rights
violations; and truth and reconciliation commissions to colof persons belonging to ethnic or minority groups.”
lect testimony and document the history of the abuses.
Domestic Prosecution
Major challenges to a new government in Afghanistan will
include establishing legitimacy and credibility as well as the rule
of law. The commitment to hold parties accountable for
human rights violations could represent an important step in
that direction. Although the legal system in Afghanistan

Truth Commissions
Truth commissions, often mandated to create an official
history of past human rights abuses, can also be charged with
proposing specific steps to deal with past abuses and to
prevent their repetition. Truth commissions are often based
continued on page 24
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Conclusion
Despite numerous setbacks and uneven results in the
attempts of African nations to establish human rights institutions, there have been some positive developments, particularly within the last decade. Clearly, the increasing international commitment to the establishment of national human
rights bodies has raised the profile of human rights issues
within Africa, and has tied international legitimacy to the continent’s efforts to improve human rights protection.
On the other hand, the international community’s involvement in the establishment of these commissions has not
always been an effective way of promoting or protecting
human rights. The advice and funding given is often generic
and not tailored to a country’s particular needs. Further,
there tends to be little coordination between the various funding sources. As in Sierra Leone, this lack of coordination often
results in development and support for only one successful
project at a time, but no effective overall strategy.
The international community’s indiscriminate support for
all human rights commissions, regardless of their effective-

Afghanistan, continued from page 5

on mandates to study the broader context in which the
abuses occur and the structural elements of the government, security forces, and society that make patterns of violations possible. Analysis and reporting that could guide
government policy would be particularly relevant regarding
the violations against women’s rights.
A truth and reconciliation commission can serve an
important and necessary function in the nation building
process, particularly when there has been a stream of human
rights violations inflicted upon the population, as in
Afghanistan. This function is not a substitute for criminal
prosecution. In fact, a commission of inquiry into human
rights has worked well when implemented in tandem with
criminal proceedings by collecting testimony and documenting abuses later used in criminal prosecution cases.
Jirga
The traditional process by which Afghans have solved
issues ranging from local disputes to those of national importance has been through the Jirga (Assembly). Representatives
of tribes and communities gather to decide questions that
affect their families, villages, tribes, region, and nation.
Groundwork for a Jirga to address war crimes can be modeled after the arrangement made by the Bonn Agreement for
the convening of a Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly). An independent commission of twenty-one constitutional and customary law experts has been charged with convening an
assembly for the purpose of selecting a transitional government. Similarly, a commission of international and customary law experts can be established to lay the framework
for accountability. Because representatives to the Jirga have
traditionally been male tribal elders, special attention will
have to be paid to the representation of women. One option
would be to establish a sub-commission to address the violence and abuses faced by women and girls.
Many advantages will result from domestic prosecution of
war crimes in an indigenous Afghan mechanism familiar to
the population. There will also be great need, however, for
24

ness, might suggest support for commissions that blatantly
fail to expose or protect against human rights abuses. As
Afronet Online, an African NGO based in Zambia, remarked,
“. . . [i]t would seem that pronouncements made loudly at
appropriate fora, coupled with structures put in place by
African governments, are part of the grand deception of their
people (and the international community) to give an impression of the improving human rights record in their respective countries.” Clearly, the international community does not
want to be seen as supporting attempts to overlook or conceal human rights abuses.
International donors and institutions must consider what
is needed to help countries develop institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights. There is a need for
greater analysis of how international funding is being distributed, as well as the need for a more result-oriented process for
supporting effective national human rights bodies. 
* Mary Ellen Tsekos is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College
of Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.

outside support to ensure compliance with international
law standards. Because Afghanistan’s infrastructure has been
destroyed and its human and material resources depleted,
serious challenges exist for an exclusively domestic response.
Significantly, Annex II, point 6 of the Bonn Agreement
retains the right of the UN to investigate human rights violations and recommend corrective measures. The international community, particularly those non-governmental organizations that have been monitoring and documenting the
situation in Afghanistan, can play an essential role as advisors, experts, and investigators.
Conclusion
It is indisputable that Afghanistan must address severe violations of humanitarian and human rights law. Such a course
of action must be taken immediately, as the threat of war
criminals entering the transitional government and potentially destabilizing Afghanistan once again looms.
Each of the mechanisms discussed has an important role
to play in the effort to hold violators of humanitarian and
human rights law accountable while rebuilding Afghanistan.
Shared domestic and international cooperation is necessary to criminally prosecute those responsible for the most
egregious violations, such as massacres. Non-criminal sanctions can be employed to ensure that those culpable—even
if not prosecuted criminally—do not assume positions of
authority. A truth commission has the advantage of beginning promptly and moving the country toward reconciliation,
as well as compiling a historical record to prevent the past
from repeating itself. Ethnic minorities and women must
receive adequate representation and attention in these proceedings, as they have faced some of the most systematic and
widespread violence. Although challenges exist to attaining accountability, Afghanistan’s compliance with international and customary law standards and its realization of
sustainable peace and reconstruction requires the new government to meet the challenge.
* Ossai Miazad is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.

